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Abstract Under highly security vulnerable, resource-restricted, and dynamically chang-
ing mobile ad hoc environments, it is critical to be able to maximize the system lifetime
while bounding the communication response time for mission-oriented mobile groups. In
this paper, we analyze the tradeoff of security versus performance for distributed intrusion
detection protocols employed in mobile group communication systems (GCSs). We inves-
tigate a distributed voting-based intrusion detection protocol for GCSs in multi-hop mobile
ad hoc networks and examine the effect of intrusion detection on system survivability mea-
sured by the mean time to security failure (MTTSF) metric and efﬁciency measured by the
communication cost metric. We identify optimal design settings under which the MTTSF
metric can be best traded off for the communication cost metric or vice versa. We conduct
extensive simulation to validate analytical results obtained. This work provides a general
model-based evaluation framework for developing and analyzing intrusion detection pro-
tocols that can dynamically adapt to changing attacker strengths with the goal of system
lifetime optimization and/or communication cost minimization.
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1 Introduction
Developing network security protocols in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) has design
challengesduetohighsecurityvulnerabilitiesanduniquecharacteristicsofMANETenviron-
ments such as open medium, dynamic changing network topology, decentralized decision-
making and cooperation, lack of centralized authority, lack of resources in mobile devices
(e.g., bandwidth, memory, computational power), and no clear line of defense [2,27]. Three
types of actions against attacks can be taken, namely, prevention, detection, and recov-
ery. Intrusion prevention techniques (e.g., encryption or authentication) can be employed in
MANETs to reduce intrusion. However, security holes cannot be perfectly eliminated. Due
to the above reason, intrusion detection mechanisms are used as a second line of defense and
have become essential for systems with the goal of high-survivability.
This paper concerns distributed intrusion detection employed in mission-oriented group
communication systems (GCSs) of MANETs for detecting and evicting compromised
nodes. The examples of mission-oriented GCSs include rescue teams with mobile devices
for disaster management, soldiers with mobile devices in battleﬁeld situations, mobile
robots with embedded sensor systems to explore the surface of Mars [31], and mobile
tanks with sensors to survey a hostile battleﬁeld for tracking bio/chemical plumes [31].
In these mission-oriented mobile applications for MANETs, guaranteeing maximum sys-
tem lifetime while minimizing bandwidth consumed is critical for successful mission
execution.
Manyemergingmobileapplicationsdependonthenotionofsecuregroupcommunication
where mobile nodes can join or leave a group dynamically [6,21,30,36]. A compromised
node in a group can compromise the security of the whole system when useful informa-
tion has been leaked out to the compromised node. Compromised nodes may also collude.
To tolerate/detect intrusions, it is essential to dynamically detect and evict compromised
nodes by adaptively enhancing the defense in response to the attacker strength. However, if
IDS is performed more frequently than needed, it may adversely affect the performance of
GCS.
BelowwebrieﬂysurveyexistingworkinintrusiondetectioninMANETsandmodel-based
evaluationofintrusiontolerance/detectionsystems.First,wesurveyexistingtechniques(e.g.,
anomaly-based or misuse-based) and architectures (e.g., hierarchical IDS) used for intrusion
detection in MANETs. Second, we survey existing work using model-based evaluation tech-
niquesforevaluatingintrusiontolerance/detectionsystems.Also,sinceourworkistosupport
secure GCSs, we brieﬂy survey basic security properties including availability, conﬁdential-
ity, integrity, and forward/backward secrecy. Later we will deﬁne security failure conditions
related to these properties.
While intrusion detection systems (IDS) for wired networks have been extensively stud-
ied, there has been little work on IDS for wireless mobile environments, particularly for
MANETs. Zhang et al. [42,43] pioneered a distributed and cooperative intrusion detection
model based on anomaly detection by which all nodes in the system run IDS to detect and
respond to intrusions. Nevertheless, no speciﬁc IDS or reactive IDS protocol was discussed.
Cluster-based IDS for MANETs has been proposed [2,3,14,15,37,39] .T h em a i ni d e ai st h a t
a cluster head (CH) collects security-related information from nodes in the same cluster and
determines if any intrusion has occurred. In particular, non-overlapping zone-based IDS was
proposed in [38] for MANETs and proven to be effective in intrusion detection. An impor-
tant issue not addressed is performance degradation due to zone-based IDS. Marti et al. [26]
developed a watchdog mechanism for identifying misbehaving nodes based on dynamical
behaviors and developed a pathrater algorithm for routing around misbehaving nodes for
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MANETs.Debaretal.[9]suggestedaggregationandcorrelationofIDSalertstoreducecom-
munication/computationaloverheadcausedbyperformingIDS.Thereisnotradeoffanalysis
between security and performance in these studies. No analysis of adaptive IDS in response
to growing attacker strength was studied. In this paper, we consider an adaptive IDS design
that is reactive to the attacker strength.
Hierarchical IDS was proposed to realize distributed anomaly-based IDS in MANETs
[3,4,13,15].However,theissuesofextralatencyandenergyconsumptionwerenotaddressed.
The assumption that the CH is tamper-resistant and the CH selection process will not be
interrupted by attackers is also questionable. Further, only security properties of IDS in
MANETs are examined without considering reactive approaches against changes to the
attackers’ behaviors. Stern et al. [37] proposed data reduction techniques to reduce com-
munication costs in their IDS design. However, detection latency introduced by data aggre-
gation and their effect on performance degradation were not investigated. Our work differs
from the prior work in that we consider the impact of IDS on performance degradation, and
identify optimal design settings of adaptive IDS based on the tradeoff between performance
(i.e., communication cost) versus security (i.e., mean time to security failure or MTTSF) for
GCSs in MANETs.
Hasswa et al. [12] and Nadeem et al. [28] proposed IDS to deal with Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks. Hasswa et al. [12] developed IDS and accordingly a response system called
Routeguard to improve both network throughput and detection accuracy. Nadeem et al. [28]
proposed an anomaly intrusion detection system using chi-sqare test and control chart to
detect intrusion and identify intruders to improve throughput as well as to reduce overhead.
Santoshetal.[32]andLiuetal.[22]employedgametheoreticapproachestodetectintrusions
and identify anomaly behaviors of nodes in MANETs. There were also studies to investi-
gate systems equipped with both intrusion detection and key management [7,41]. To reduce
monitoring overhead for identifying anomaly behaviors of nodes, a method to select critical
nodes (e.g., suspicious nodes to monitor) was proposed in [16]. Sen et al. [33] used a learn-
ing technique based on artiﬁcial intelligence to detect known attacks in MANETs. Our work
differs from these prior studies in that we specifically consider the effect of adaptive IDS
design on both the performance and security properties of GCSs in MANETs.
Recently, Subhadrabandhu et al. [38] studied the tradeoff between energy/computa-
tional/communication resource consumption versus IDS accuracy based on distributed IDS.
Algorithms were developed to explore the tradeoff. Our work differs from their work in
that we specifically deal with GCSs in MANETs and we allow the optimal design settings
of adaptive distributed IDS to be identiﬁed, when given the system-imposed security and
performance requirements.
To evaluate both security and performance characteristics of IDS in GCSs, the approach
used in this paper has its root in model-based quantitative analysis [29]. In the literature, we
haveseensomerecentworkextendingmodel-basedquantitativeanalysistosecurityanalysis.
Liu et al. [23] and Boppana et al. [1] utilized Markov models to analyze the security prop-
erties of a class of intrusion detection algorithms. Liu et al. [23] utilized a Markov decision
process to analyze the security characteristics of a framework that combines intrusion detec-
tion with authentication for MANETs. Boppana et al. [1] also utilized a Markov model to
evaluate false positives of IDS. Dacier et al. [8] proposed a novel approach to model the sys-
tem as a privilege graph demonstrating operational security vulnerabilities and transformed
the privilege graph into a Markov chain based on all possible successful attack scenarios.
Jonsson et al. [14] presented a quantitative Markov model of attacker behaviors using data
obtained from several experiments conducted over 2 years. They postulated that the process
describing an attacker may bedivided into multiple phases, suchas learning, standard attack,
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and innovative attack. Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [11] presented a state transition model to
describe dynamic behaviors of intrusion tolerant systems. Their model includes a framework
to deﬁne the vulnerability and the threat set. Madan et al. [25] employed a semi-Markov
process (SMP) model to evaluate security attributes of an intrusion tolerant system. Madan
etal.also[25]usedasteady-stateanalysistoobtaindependabilitymeasuressuchasavailabil-
ity, and a transient analysis with absorbing states to obtain security measures such as mean
time to security failure (MTTSF). Wang et al. [40] utilized a higher-level formalism based
on stochastic petri nets (SPN) for security analysis of intrusion tolerant systems. Leversage
and James [20] suggested a security metric to intelligently compare systems and to make
corporate security decisions. They proposed a mean time to compromise (MTTC) metric to
measure the time needed for an attacker to successfully disrupt a target system. Most of
the previous work cited above, however, often only focused on security measures without
considering the impact of deploying security mechanisms on the performance of the system.
Further, there was no solution provided to address the system optimization issue in terms of
identifying the optimal design settings of adaptive IDS for mission-oriented mobile groups.
Our work addresses this issue.
Very recently, Cho and Chen [7] also utilized model-based evaluation techniques to ana-
lyze the performance characteristics of IDS based on linear detection integrated with key
management based on threshold batch rekeying. However, the focus was on modeling the
effect of integrating linear detection-based IDS with threshold-based batch rekeying on the
MTTSF of a system in which only a single group exists. In this paper we investigate dis-
tributed intrusion detection in general, considering various ways of performing intelligent
intrusion detection (logarithm, linear, exponential) in response to attacker strengths. Also
unlike the prior work, we consider immediate rekeying for key management as well as net-
work partition/merge possibilities due to node failure and mobility events, such that multiple
groups may exist in response to network dynamics. Finally, unlike the prior work, the goal
of this paper is to identify the best intrusion detection algorithm (logarithm, linear, expo-
nential), along with the best periodic interval to maximize the MTTSF and to minimize the
communication overhead.
The contributions of the paper are as follows. First, we develop model-based evalua-
tion methods to quantitatively analyze the tradeoff between security and performance of
mobile GCSs in MANETs in the presence of inside attackers and intrusion detection mecha-
nisms, recognizing the fact that security mechanisms often have impacts on the performance
property of the system. We develop an analytical model to succinctly describe the inside
attacker, the GCS, and distributed intrusion detection mechanisms with the goal to evalu-
ate the effect of intrusion detection on security and performance properties of the system.
Second, when given a set of parameter values characterizing the operational or environ-
mental conditions of the system, we identify the optimal intrusion detection interval under
which the MTTSF metric is maximized. Moreover, we effectively trade off security for
performance, or vice versa, such that system designers can adjust the intrusion detection
interval to maximize MTTSF while satisfying imposed performance requirements in terms
of overall communication cost. Third, we propose a robust, efﬁcient, and adaptive distrib-
uted intrusion detection mechanism that dynamically adjusts the intrusion detection interval
and a detection function optimally reacting to dynamically changing attacker strength. Our
IDS protocol considers the effect of possible collusion of compromised nodes as well as
IDS intrinsic defects including false positives and false negatives. Lastly, we model our
secure GCS for MANETs based on realistic behaviors of inside attackers. To be speciﬁc,
we consider multiple levels of attacker strength reﬂecting system conditions and attacker
behaviors.
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2 Preliminary
2.1 Secure Group Communication Systems in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Secure GCSs are most often seen in military settings where combat units spread out in a
geographical area without a communication infrastructure but must maintain a consistent
view in order to make correct combat decisions. Group members must communicate each
other state changes, such as changes of membership of nodes, their locations, and approach-
ing objects. Very typically, such a military deployment is mission-oriented and the goal is to
complete the combat mission within system lifetime. In this sense, the security requirement
is expressed in terms of a threshold for MTTSF such that the system must be able to survive
security threats past the minimum mission time. The timeliness requirement is expressed in
terms of the delay requirement per packet. This translates into a maximum network trafﬁc
rate which bounds the delay or response time per packet.
Anefﬁcientwaytoachievesecuregroupcommunicationsistouseasymmetrickey,called
the group key, shared by group members. Group members may agree upon the group key
by means of a group key agreement protocol in a MANET in which there is no centralized
key server. Group members employ the group key to encrypt group messages. By employing
the group key as a secret key, only members of the group are able to decrypt and read group
messages [21]. This achieves the conﬁdentiality property for secure group communications.
In a dynamic group setting where users can join or leave the group at any time,
the group key needs to be rekeyed. There are the two main security properties com-
monly associated with rekeying [30,36], namely, forward secrecy, which means that an
adversary who knows previous group keys cannot identify subsequent group keys, and
backward secrecy, which means that an adversary who knows the current group key
cannot discover previous group keys. To maintain both backward and forward secrecy,
rekeying (i.e., change the group key) is performed whenever a group membership change
event occurs due to a user newly joining the group or a current member leaving or being
evicted.
For MANETs, there is no centralized trusted key server. Instead a distributed key man-
agementprotocol,acontributorykeyagreement(CKA) protocol,wouldbeusedforrekeying
upon a join/leave/eviction event. Without loss of generality, this paper uses a CKA proto-
col called GDH (Group Difﬁe-Hellman) [35,36], a well-known distributed key management
protocol for secret key generation and distribution in MANETs.
2.2 Distributed Intrusion Detection Protocols
We consider two types of intrusion detection protocols applicable to GCSs in MANETs, i.e.,
host-based IDS versus voting-based IDS. The ﬁrst type is host-based IDS [42,43] for local
detectioninwhicheachnodeperformslocaldetectiontodetermineifaneighboringnodehas
been compromised. Each node may implement its host-based IDS preinstalled with standard
existing IDS techniques such as misuse detection (also called signature-based detection) and
anomaly detection [18,19,42,43] so that our proposed voting-based IDS can be independent
of the host-based IDS used as a general framework. Each node may evaluate its neighbors
based on information collected, mostly route-related and trafﬁc-related information [13].
We measure the effectiveness of IDS techniques applied (e.g., misuse detection or anomaly
detection) for host-based IDS by two parameters, namely, the false negative probability (p1)
and false positive probability (p2). In general, when the system uses misuse detection for
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IDS, it tends to have more false negatives and less false positives (e.g., higher p1 and lower
p2). On the other hand, when the system employs anomaly detection for IDS, it is likely to
have fewer false negatives and more false positives (e.g., lower p1 and higher p2).
The second type is voting-based IDS for cooperative detection based on majority voting.
Voting has been used as a mechanism to achieve fault tolerance [5]; we adopt it to cope with
intrusions. For voting-based IDS to be performed, each node is preinstalled with host-based
IDS to collect information to detect the status of neighboring nodes. Periodically a target
node would be evaluated by m vote-participants dynamically selected where m is a design
parameter. If the majority of m nodes decided to vote against the target node, then the target
node would be evicted from the system by means of rekeying. This adds intrusion tolerance
to tolerate collusion of compromised nodes in MANETs as it takes the majority of “bad”
nodes among m nodes to work against the system. We characterize voting-based IDS by
two parameters, namely, false negative probability (Pfn) and false positive probability (Pfp).
These two parameters can be calculated based on (a) the per-node false negative and positive
probabilities(p1andp2)ofhost-basedIDSineachnode;(b)thenumberofvote-participants,
m, selected to vote for or against a target node; and (c) an estimate of the current number of
compromisednodeswhichmaycolludewiththeobjectivetodisrupttheserviceofthesystem.
Since m nodes are selected to vote, if the majority of m voting-participants (i.e., ≥  m/2 )
cast negative votes against a target node, the target node is regarded as compromised and
will be evicted from the system.
3 System Model
This paper concerns a mission-oriented GCS consisting of mobile groups in MANETs
equipped with intrusion detection to mainly deal with inside attackers. We deﬁne a mobile
group based on “connectivity.” When all nodes are connected, there is only a single group in
the system. That is, group members must maintain connectivity for them to be in the same
group. The GCS and its constituent mobile groups are “mission-oriented” in the sense that a
mobile group may be partitioned into several groups due to network partition derived from
node mobility or node failure, but each group will continue to execute the mission amid
group partition and merge activities. Moreover, the GCS fails when any mobile group fails,
modeling the case in which a security failure of any mobile group compromises the mission
assigned, e.g., in secret mission situations. We assume that each member has a private key
anditscertiﬁedpublickeyavailableforauthenticationpurposes.Whenanewmemberjoinsa
mobilegroup,thenewmember’sidentityisauthenticatedbasedonthememberpublic/private
key pair by applying the challenge/response mechanism. We assume that the GCS maintains
viewsynchrony(VS)[6,21,30,36]whichguaranteesthatmessagesaredeliveredreliablyand
inorder.WecharacterizetheworkloadandoperationalconditionsofaGCSinMANETsbya
set of model parameters. We assume that the inter-arrival times of join and leave requests are
exponentiallydistributedwiththeirratesbeingλandμrespectively.Alsoweassumethatthe
inter-arrival time of data packets issued by a node for group communication is exponentially
distributed with rate λq. The assumption of exponential distribution can be relaxed since
the SPN performance model developed is capable of allowing any general distribution for a
transition time. We assume that the time to perform a rekeying operation upon a membership
changeevent(i.e.,joinorleaveevent)oraforcedevictionismeasuredbasedonGDH[35,36]
to realize distributed key management in MANETs.
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3.1 Attacker Model, IDS Accuracy, and Security Failure Definition
Secure GCSs in MANETs must meet four requirements in the presence of inside and outside
attackers: conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, and authentication. The availability property
is achieved by maximizing the lifetime of the system in the presence of insider attacks. The
other security properties can be achieved by using intrusion prevention techniques, such
as encryption (i.e., hash functions), authentication (MAC-message authentication code or
public/private key pairs preinstalled), to deal with outsider attacks.
We assume that there are intrusion prevention techniques in place, such as encryption or
authentication, to deal with outsider attacks (e.g., disrupting trafﬁc, modifying data, eaves-
dropping). Insider attacks are due to compromised nodes disguised as legitimate members
to disrupt the system. An inside attacker may obtain secret information and pass it to outside
attackers (i.e., illegal data leak out) to compromise the system. It can also collude with other
inside attackers to compromise other good nodes or entice the system to evict good nodes
from the system. When the system is populated with too many compromised nodes, a secu-
rity failure will also occur. In the paper, we will use the terms inside attackers (or simply
attackers) and compromised nodes interchangeably.
Recognizing the principles in [10] that attacker behaviors are not always random, we use
three attacker functions to model the attacker strength based on the prediction of time and
effort made to perform an attack as follows:
• Logarithmic time attacker: The attacker increasingly takes longer time to compromise
nodes in the system, following a logarithmic function curve. This models the scenario
where the system has detected attackers (i.e., compromised nodes) and enhanced the
defenses of the remaining nodes, making it increasingly harder for the attacker to com-
promise more nodes.
• Linear time attacker: The attacker compromises nodes one after the other with the node
compromisingratelineartothenumberofcompromisednodesinthesystem.Thisapplies
to the case in which compromised nodes do not collude and just perform constant time
attacks.
• Polynomial time attacker: The attacker increasingly takes shorter time to compromise
nodes in the system, following an exponential function curve. This models the scenario
where the attacker learns secret information from compromised nodes in the system and
exploits it to more easily compromise other nodes within a shorter time.
WeassumethatIDSwillperformitsfunctionperiodically.Thedetectionintervalisdynam-
ically adjusted in response to the accumulated number of intrusions that have been detected
in the system. Similar to the attacker behavior model above, we consider three detection
functions to model the IDS activities in terms of periodicity, namely, logarithmic periodic
detection, linear periodic detection,a n dpolynomial periodic detection, as follows:
• Logarithmic periodic detection: In this detection scheme, the system performs intrusion
detection in a conservative way with a rate logarithmic to the number of compromised
nodes that have been identiﬁed. This detection approach is usually applicable in a low
or moderate level of hostile network environments. Further, this can be effective to save
energy consumption introduced by IDS as well as to reduce false positives.
• Linear periodic detection: This system performs IDS with a linear rate to the number
of intrusions that have been detected in the system. Since this approach performs IDS
more frequently than logarithmic periodic detection, it is a suitable detection approach
when the employed IDS technique has high accuracy with relatively low number of false
positives and negatives.
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• Polynomial periodic detection: This detection scheme aggressively performs IDS by
increasing the detection rate in a polynomial fashion to the number of observed com-
promised nodes in the system. This scheme is effective for very high quality IDS with
very low false negatives and false positives. Otherwise, using this scheme has the adverse
effectofhavingmorefalsepositivesandnegativesbyperformingIDSmorethanitneeds.
To realize a fully distributed intrusion detection mechanism in MANETs, we assume that
each node has host-based IDS preinstalled to perform intrusion detection activities. Host-
based IDS has two key parameters, p1 and p2, characterizing the false negative probability
andfalsepositiveprobabilityrespectivelyrelatedtotheaccuracyorqualityofIDS.Eachnode
casts a vote for or against a target node based on the decision made using its host-based IDS.
To alleviate collusion among compromised nodes, the system could perform voting-based
IDS by which the majority of vote-participants must agree to evict a target node before the
target node is evicted. The number of vote-participants (m) is a system parameter whose
effect will be analyzed in the paper. Voting-based IDS is characterized by the false negative
probability(Pfn)andfalsepositiveprobability(Pfp)whichdependonp1andp2,respectively,
and the number of compromised nodes in the group. We deﬁne two security group failure
conditions so that a mobile group enters a security failure state when one of the two security
group failure conditions stated below is true. That is, the GCS fails if any of mobile groups
fails when either Condition C1 or C2 listed below is true.
• Condition C1: a compromised but undetected member requests and subsequently obtains
data using the group key. The system is in a failure state because data have been leaked
out to a compromised node, leading the loss of system integrity in a security sense.
• Condition C2: more than 1/3 of member nodes are compromised but undetected by IDS.
We assume the Byzantine Failure model [10] such that when more than 1/3 of member
nodes in a mobile group are compromised, the mobile group is compromised, resulting
in the loss of availability [17]o fs y s t e ms e r v i c e .
If a member node is detected as compromised by IDS, the system won’t allow the mem-
ber node to request data anymore and will evict the member immediately to satisfy the
forward/backward secrecy requirement, one of conﬁdentiality properties. After a node is
detected as compromised and evicted from the system, it cannot rejoin the group again. That
is, there is no recovery mechanism available in the system to repair a compromised member
and make it a trusted member node again. Initially, all nodes are trusted.
3.2 Security and Performance Metrics
• MTTSF(meantimetosecurityfailure):Thismetricindicatestheaveragetimeelapsedfor
the GCS to reach a security failure state. The GCS fails when any mobile group reaches a
securityfailurestatewhen(1)datahavebeenleakedouttoacompromisedbutundetected
membernode(i.e.,C1),or(2)morethan1/3ofthemembernodeshavebeencompromised
(i.e., C2). Note that illegal data leak out only occurs when a compromised but undetected
member requests data and subsequently obtains data using the group key. As a security
metric,lowerMTTSFmeansfasterlossofsystemintegrityorlossofavailability.Adesign
goal is to maximize MTTSF.
• Communication trafﬁc cost ( ˆ Ctotal): This metric indicates total trafﬁcs incurred per time
unit(sec)includinggroupcommunication,statusexchange,rekeying,intrusiondetection,
beacon, group partition/merge and mobility-induced activities. Since all nodes share a
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UCm DCm
T_CP
T_IDS
GF
T_DRQ
T_FA
Tm
T_MER
NG
T_PAR
T_RK
Fig. 1 SPN performance model
Table 1 Places, transitions, and transition rates for the SPN model in Fig. 1
Place Meaning
Tm Mark(Tm) means the number of trusted member
nodes
UCm Mark(UCm) means the number of compromised but
undetected member nodes
DCm Mark(DCm) means the number of compromised and
detected member nodes
GF Mark(GF) = 1 means that group security failure has
occurred due to illegal data leak-out
Transition Rate Physical meaning
T_CP A(mc) A node has been compromised
T_IDS mark(UCm) ∗ D(md) ∗ (1 − Pfn) A compromised node has been detected
T_FA mark(Tm) ∗ D(md) ∗ Pfp A node has been falsely diagnosed as compromised
T_RK 1/Tcm A rekeying operation has been performed
T_DRQ mark(UCm) ∗ p1 ∗ λq A group communication operation has been performed
wireless bandwidth BW, a high ˆ Ctotal will be translated into a high level of contention and
consequently a high delay or response time for group communication. A design goal is
to minimize ˆ Ctotal.
4 Performance Model
We develop a stochastic petri net (SPN) model as shown in Fig. 1 to describe the behavior of
a mobile group in the presence of insider attacks and intrusion detection activities, with the
goalofidentifyingoptimaldesignsettings(i.e.,optimalintrusiondetectioninterval,detection
function, and number of vote-participants) to maximize MTTSF while satisfying imposed
performance(i.e.,overallcommunicationcost)requirements.Table1summarizesplacesand
transitions along with transition rates in the SPN model with their physical meanings given.
Below we describe how the SPN model is constructed:
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• TheSPNmodeldescribesthebehaviorofasinglemobilegroupasitevolves.Thismobile
group may partition into two and may merge with another group during its lifetime. We
track trusted members, compromised members undetected, and compromised members
detected during the group’s lifetime to understand its security and performance charac-
teristics. Certainly the system knows the number of compromised nodes detected by IDS
at all times. However, the system does not know the number of compromised nodes not
yet detected. It only knows the total number of member nodes. The SPN model pre-
dicts the number of compromised but yet detected nodes through knowledge of the node
compromising rate or the attacker function explained below.
• We use places to classify nodes except for place NG which holds the current number of
groups in the system. Specifically, place Tm holds trusted members, UCm holds com-
promised nodes not yet detected by IDS, and DCm holds compromised nodes that have
been detected by IDS. Note that Tm, UCm,a n dD C m represent nodes in one group, not
in the system. To be more speciﬁc, the numbers of nodes in places Tm, UCm,a n dD C m,
obtained by mark(Tm),mark(UCm), and mark(DCm), respectively, would be adjusted
based on the number of groups existing in the system (obtained by mark (NG)), which
changes upon a group merge/partition event.
• We use transitions to model events. Specifically,T_MER and T_PAR model group merge
and partition events, respectively; T_CP models a node being compromised. T_FA mod-
els a node being falsely identiﬁed as compromised. T_IDS models a compromised node
being detected. T_RK models rekeying. T_DRQ models a data leak security failure (i.e.,
C1). A ﬁring of a transition will change the state of the system, which is represented
by the distribution of tokens in the SPN. For example, mark(NG) changes upon ﬁring
T_MER or T_PAR since the number of groups changes upon a group merge or partition
event; the number of compromised nodes undetected increments by 1 and, place UCm
will hold one more token when T_CP ﬁres. A transition is eligible to ﬁre when the ﬁring
conditions associated with the event are met. The ﬁring conditions are (1) its input place
must contain at least one token and (2) the associated enabling guard function, if exists,
must return true. For example, T_CP is enabled to ﬁre when there exists “good” nodes in
the group, that is, place Tm holds at least one token, and the enabling function associated
with T_CP returns true.
• Except for tokens contained in place NG,w eu s ea“ t o k e n ”i nt h eS P Nm o d e lt or e p r e s e n t
anodeinthegroup.Thepopulationofeachtypeofnodesisequaltothenumberoftokens
in the corresponding place. Initially, all N members are trusted in one group and put in
place Tm as tokens.
• Trustedmembersmaybecomecompromisedbecauseofinsiderattackswithanode-com-
promising rate A(mc). This is modeled by ﬁring transition T_CP and moving tokens one
at a time (if it exists) from place Tm to place UCm.S e eE q .3 for the parameterization of
A(mc).
• Tokens in place UCm represent compromised but undetected member nodes. We con-
sider the system as having experienced a security failure when data are leaked out to
compromised but undetected members, i.e., C1. A compromised and undetected member
will attempt to compromise data from other members in the group. Because of the use
of host-based IDS, a node will reply to such a request only if it could not identify the
requesting node as compromised with the false negative probability p1. This is modeled
by associating transition T_DRQ with rate p1 ∗ λq ∗ mark(UCm). The ﬁring of transi-
tion T_DRQ will move a token into place GF, at which point we regard the system as
experiencing a security failure due to C1.
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• A compromised node in place UCm may be detected by IDS before it compromises data
in the GCS. The intrusion detection activity of the mobile group is modeled by the IDS
detection rate D(md). See Eq. 4 for the parameterization of D(md). Whether the damage
has been done by a compromised node before the compromised node is detected depends
on the relative magnitude of the node-compromising rate (A(mc)) versus the IDS detec-
tionrate D(md).WhentransitionT_IDSﬁres,atokeninplaceUCm willbemovedtoplace
DCm, meaning that a compromised but undetected node now becomes detected by IDS.
Forvoting-basedIDS,thetransitionrateofT_IDSismark(UCm)∗D(md)∗(1−Pfn),tak-
ing into consideration of the number of compromised but yet detected nodes and the false
negativeprobabilityofvoting-basedIDS.Voting-basedIDScanalsofalse-positivelyiden-
tifyatrustedmembernodeascompromised.Thisismodeledbymovingatrustedmember
in place Tm to place DCm after transition T_FA ﬁres with rate mark(Tm) ∗ D(md) ∗ Pfp.
Note that voting-based IDS parameters, Pfn and Pfp, can be derived based on p1 and
p2, the number of vote-participants (m), and the current number of compromised nodes
which may collude to disrupt the service of the system. Later we will show how we may
parameterize Pfn and Pfp.
• Finally,themobilegroupexperiencesasecurityfailureifeithersecurityfailurecondition,
C1orC2,ismet.Wemodelthisbymakingthegroupenteranabsorbingstatewheneither
C1 or C2 is true. To achieve this, we associate every transition in the SPN model with an
enabling function that returns false (disabling the transition from ﬁring) when either C1
or C2 is met, and returns true otherwise. For the SPN model, C1 is true when mark (GF)
> 0 representing that data have been leaked out to compromised, undetected members;
C2 is true when more than 1/3 of member nodes are compromised but undetected as
indicated by:
mark (UCm)
mark (Tm) + mark (UCm)
>
1
3
(1)
4.1 Parameterization
Here we describe the parameterization process, i.e., how to give model parameters proper
values reﬂecting the operational and environmental conditions of the system.
• Tcm: Recall that Tcm is the communication time required for broadcasting a rekey mes-
sage for a join or leave event. The reciprocal of Tcm is the rate of transition T_RK. Based
on GDH, the following formula is used to calculate Tcm:
if(N > 1)Tcm =
3bGDH (N − 1)
BW
else Tcm =
bGDH
BW
(2)
whereNisthenumberofcurrentmembernodesindicatedbymark(Tm)+mark(UCm), bGDH
is the length of an intermediate value, and BW is the wireless network bandwidth (Mbps).
We assume that the size of the rekey message is at least bGDH when the current number of
members is zero or one.
• A(mc): This is an attacker function that returns the rate at which nodes are compromised
in the mobile group. It will apply to transition T_CP in the SPN model. Three different
attacker strengths are considered based on the time taken to compromise a node, namely,
logarithmic, linear,a n dpolynomial time attacker, as follows:
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Alog (mc) = λc × logp (mc), Alinear (mc) = λc × mc,
Apoly (mc) = λc × (mc)p where mc =
mark (Tm) + mark (UCm)
mark (Tm)
(3)
These three attacker strengths differ by the way the node compromising rate increases as
more nodes become compromised. For the linear attacker function, the node compromised
rate increases linearly with the number of compromised nodes. Hence, Alinear(mc) = λcmc
where mc reﬂects the degree of compromised nodes currently in the group and λc is the base
node compromising rate initially given that there is no compromised node in the group. For
Alog(mc), the compromising rate increases in logarithm form with the number of compro-
mised nodes. For Apoly(mc) the compromising rate increases in exponential form with the
number of compromised nodes. Note that these three forms are prediction functions for the
node compromising rate. The base compromising rate (λc) can be obtained by ﬁrst-order
approximation from observing the number of compromised nodes over a time period. We
also note that p is a base index parameter selected to reﬂect the degree of changes of the
logarithmic and polynomial attacker functions with respect to the number of compromised
nodes. It requires ﬁne tuning after sufﬁcient data are collected. We choose p = 3i nt h i s
paper.
• D(md): This is a detection function that returns the rate at which IDS is invoked. Three
differentdetectionfunctions,namely,logarithmic,linear,andpolynomialperiodicdetec-
tion, are parameterized as follows:
Dlog (md) =
1
TIDS
× logp (md), Dlinear (md) =
1
TIDS
× md,
Dpoly (md) =
1
TIDS
× (md)p where md =
Ninit
mark (Tm) + mark (UCm)
(4)
These three functions differ by the way the detection rate changes with the number of com-
promised nodes that have been detected by IDS. For the linear detection function, the IDS
detectionrateincreaseslinearlywiththenumberofcompromisednodesdetected. Dlinear(mc)
isthelinearperiodicdetectionfunctionwheremc indicatesthedegreeofcompromisednodes
that have been detected by IDS, and TIDS is the base detection time interval which we aim to
determine for maximizing MTTSF when applying voting-based IDS. The logarithmic detec-
tion function, Dlog(md), and exponential detection function, Dpoly(md) ,h a v et h es a m ef o r m
as their counterparts in the attacker function. Note that p is deﬁned similarly as in Eq. 3.
• Group merge and partition: We model group merge and partition events by a birth-death
process with arrival rate = λnp,i and departure rate = μnm,i where state i represents that
thereareimobilegroupsintheGCS.Weobtaingroupmerging/partitioningratesviasim-
ulation.Theassumptionsusedare:(1)arandomwaypoint(RWP)mobilitymodelisused
todescribeanode’smobilitybehavior;and(2)theinter-arrivaltimeofanode’sjoin/leave
operationisexponentiallydistributed.Weﬁrstobservethenumberofmergeandpartition
events by simulation for a sufﬁciently long period of time T. We next observe the sojourn
time Si in state i, i.e., when i groups are present in the system. Let Nnm,i and Nnp,i be
the numbers of group merge and partition events observed in state i, respectively. Then,
the merging/partitioning rates in state i, represented by μnm,i and λnp,i, are computed
by the ﬁrst-order approximation as:
μnm,i =
Nnm,i
Si
,λ np,i =
Nnp,i
Si
(5)
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Note that the group merging/partitioning rates parameterized above are functions of the node
mobility and density in general. We observe that when node density is high, group merge is
more likely to occur than group partition, leading to a smaller number of groups (lower i)
observed in the system. On the other hand, as the node density is low, the system is more
likely tostay at largenumberof groups(higheri) with high probability.In otherwords, when
the node density is low, group partition is more likely to occur than group merge.
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• Pfn, Pfp: Pfn is the probability of false negatives deﬁned as the number of compromised
nodes diagnosed by voting-based IDS as trusted healthy nodes (i.e., detecting a bad node
as a good node) over the number of detected nodes. On the other hand, Pfp is the probabil-
ity of false positives deﬁned as the number of normal nodes ﬂagged as anomaly over the
numberoftrustednormalnodes.Weconsidertheintrinsicdefectofhost-basedIDSineach
node as well as the possible collusion of compromised nodes during the voting process. If
a vote-participant is compromised, it can cast a negative vote to evict a healthy target node
in the group or it can cast a positive vote for a malicious node to keep more compromised
nodes in the group. Equation 6 reﬂects these two cases of false positives or false negatives
introduced into the group respectively. Here m is the number of vote-participants to cast
a vote against a target node, pf is p1 for calculating Pfn or p2 for calculating Pfp, Nbad is
the number of currently compromised nodes in the group represented as mark(UCm), and
Ngood is the number of currently healthy nodes in the group indicated as mark(Tm). Pfp is
obtainedwhenthemajorityofvotersconsistsofbadnodeswhocastanegativevoteagainst
a good node, and good nodes who mistakenly diagnose a good node as a bad node with
theprobability ofp2(i.e.,p2isaper-nodefalse positiveprobability), resulting inahealthy
node being evicted. On the other hand, Pfn occurs when the majority of voters is from
positive votes by bad nodes (i.e., casting a positive vote against a bad node) or good nodes
who mistakenly diagnose a bad node as a good node with the probability of p1 (i.e., p1 is a
per-node false negative probability), keeping more compromised nodes undetected in the
group. Note that for given p1 and p2 values, Pfn and Pfp still vary dynamically, reﬂecting
changing network and operational conditions, such as the degree of compromised nodes,
node density, and number of vote-participants (m) used over time.
4.2 MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal Calculation
MTTSFisobtainedusingtheconceptofmeantimetoabsorption(MTTA)intheSPNmodel.
Specifically,weusearewardassignmentsuchthatarewardof1isassignedtoallstatesexcept
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absorbing states which is modeled based on the two security failure conditions (i.e., if either
C1 or C2 is met, the system fails). Then the MTTA or the MTTSF of the system is simply
the expected accumulated reward until absorption, E [Y (∞)], deﬁned as:
E [Y (∞)] =
∞  
i∈s
ri
∞  
0
Pi (t)dt (7)
where S denotes the set of all states except the absorbing states, ri (reward) is 1 for those
states, and Pi(t) is the probability of state i at time t.
We calculate ˆ Ctotal by the probability-weighted average of ˆ Ctotal,i representing the com-
munication cost incurred per time unit (s) in state i. Specifically, ˆ Ctotal is calculated by
accumulating ˆ Ctotal,i (t) over MTTSF divided by MTTSF, i.e.,
ˆ Ctotal =
  MTTSF
0 ˆ Ctotal,i (t)dt
MTTSF
(8)
ˆ Ctotal,i is calculated as:
ˆ Ctotal,i = ˆ CGC,i + ˆ Cstatus,i + ˆ Crekey,i + ˆ CIDS,i + ˆ Cbecon,i + ˆ Cmp,i (9)
where ˆ CGC,i, ˆ Cstatus,i, ˆ Crekey,i, ˆ CIDS,i, ˆ Cbeacon,i,a n d ˆ Cmp,i, are the costs per time unit for
group communication, status exchange, rekeying, intrusion detection, beacon, group parti-
tion/merge,andmobilityevents,respectively,giventhatthenumberofgroupsinthesystemis
i. Below we explain how we parametrize ˆ CGC,i, ˆ Cstatus,i, ˆ Crekey,i, ˆ CIDS,i, ˆ Cbeacon,i and ˆ Cmp,i.
Note that we have omitted (t) in each term of Eq. 9 for simplicity.
• ˆ CGC,i: this is for the communication cost incurred by group communication activities. It
is calculated by:
ˆ CGC,i = λq × N × bGC × Hi (10)
where λq is the group communication rate, N is the number of active group members in the
single group we are observing (i.e., mark(UCm)+mark(Tm)), bGC is the message size (bits)
of a group communication packet, and Hi is the number of hops a multicast packet travels
from a node to all group members connected by a binary tree structure, given as:
Hi = ri/R × (N − 1) where ri = r/
√
i (11)
Here ri is the radius of the operational group area when i groups exist in the system and R is
the wireless radio range used.
ˆ Cstatus,i: this is for group node status exchange for intrusion detection. It is calculated by:
ˆ Cstatus,i =
(N × bs) × Hi
Tstatus
(12)
where Tstatus is the periodic time interval for disseminating a status exchange message, N
is the number of group members in a group, and bs is the message size (bits) of a status
exchange packet.
• ˆ Crekey,i: this is for group key rekeying due to join/leave events and forced evictions to
evict detected compromised nodes. It is calculated as:
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ˆ Crekey,i = ˆ Cjoin/leave,i + ˆ Ceviction,i (13)
where ˆ Cjoin/leave,i is the cost introduced by join and leave operations per time unit and
ˆ Ceviction,i is the cost introduced by forced evictions per time unit. The term ˆ Cjoin/leave,i is
calculated by:
ˆ Cjoin/leave,i =  J × Cjoin,i +  L × Cleave,i (14)
where  J and  L are aggregate join and leave rates with  J = λ × N × μ/(λ + μ) and
 L = μ × N × λ/(λ + μ),a n dCjoin,i and Cleave,i are the rekeying costs per join/leave
operation, calculated as:
Cjoin,i = Cleave,i = (Hi × Mmembers
updates ) + CGDH,i (15)
CGDH,i ={ bGDH(2N − 3) × (N − 1)}+{ bGDH × N × Hi} (16)
Here Hi is as given in Eq. 11, Mmembers
update is the number of bits to update the group member
view, and CGDH,i is the rekeying cost when i groups exist in the system. In Eq. 16,t h eﬁ r s t
term indicates the unicast communication cost in stages of 1 and 3 of GDH while the second
term accounts for the multicast communication cost in stages of 2 and 4 of GDH. The term
ˆ Ceviction,i in Eq. 13 is calculated as:
ˆ Ceviction,i =[ rate(T_IDS) + rate(T_FA)]× ˆ Cleave,i (17)
where rate(T_IDS) is the IDS intrusion detection rate and rate(T_FA) is the IDS false alarm
ratebywhichnodesareidentiﬁedascompromisednodes.Bothratesmaybeobtainedreadily
from evaluating the SPN performance model.
• ˆ CIDS,i: this is the communication cost due to IDS. For voting-based IDS, this cost is
computed as:
ˆ CIDS,i = D(md) × (1 − Pfn) × N ×[ bm−list + m × bv]×Hi (18)
where D(md) is the detection rate, Pfn is the probability of false negatives, N is the number
of current members in a group, m is the number of vote-participants against a target node,
bm−list is the message size (bits) of the list containing m vote participants, and bv is the
message size (bits) of a vote.
• ˆ Cbeacon,i: this is the communication cost due to beaconing messages being multicast to
group members. It is calculated by:
ˆ Cbeacon,i =  RB × Malive × Hi (19)
 RB = N ×
 
N
λ + μ
 
×
1
TRB
(20)
• ˆ Cmp,i: this is the communication cost due to group merge and partition events. It is
computed by:
ˆ Cmp,i = Cpartition,i + Cmerge,i (21)
Cpartition,i = λnp,i × Cnp,i (22)
Cmerge,i = μnm,i × Cnm,i (23)
Cnp,i = 2 × (Hi × Mmembers
update + Crekey,i), Cnm,i = Hi × Mmembers
update + Crekey,i
(24)
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Table 2 Parameters and their default values
Parameter Values Parameter Values Parameter Values
λ once per 1 h p1 = p2 1% bv 8 bytes
μ once per 4 h r 500 m bGC 100 bytes
TIDS 5–1,200 s Ninit 100 bGDH 8 bytes
Tstatus 2s D(md) Linear attack p 3
λc once per 12 h A(mc) Linear detection m 5
λq once per min bs 50 bytes BW 1 Mbps
where λnp,i and μnm,i are group partitioning and merging rates where there exist i groups in
the system, as given in Eq. 5, Cnp,i and Cnm,i are communication costs generated by group
partition and merge events when the system is in state i, Mmembers
update is the number of bits to
update the group member view, and Hi is the number of hops from a node to other group
members as given in Eq. 11.
5 Numerical Data and Analysis
We present numerical data obtained through the evaluation of the SPN model developed and
provide physical interpretations. Our objective is to identify the optimal intrusion detection
interval (TIDS) that will maximize MTTSF while satisfying performance requirements of
the system. We also identify the best detection function to use in response to the attacker
function (compromising rate) detected at runtime. Extensive simulation has been conducted
to validate analytical results obtained.
Table 2 summarizes the set of parameters and their default values used. In particular, the
bandwidth of 1 Mbps is a reasonable assumption for a node in MANETs based on 802.11,
especiallyingeographiclocationswithphysicalobstacles;p1andp2areselectedat1%based
on the assumption of medium to high-quality IDS being used; and, the node speed is derived
from the mobility rate, as given by Eq. 25 below. We note that p1 and p2 are two parameters
representing false negative and false positive probabilities for characterizing any host-based
IDS. We vary the values of key parameters including the number of vote-participants in
voting-based IDS (m), group communication rate (λq), and base compromising rate (λc) to
analyzetheireffectsontheoptimalbasedetectionintervalformaximizingMTTSF.Theratio
of join to leave events is set to 4, reﬂecting the fact that nodes join a group much faster than
they leave a group. Group members communicate with other group members once per 2 min.
The rate at which nodes are compromised is once per 12 h, reﬂecting a medium-high level
of attack strength by the attackers.
5.1 Analysis
We ﬁrst analyze the effect of intrusion detection interval (TIDS) on MTTSF as a function of
the number of vote-participants (m) and demonstrate that there exists an optimal intrusion
detection interval (TIDS) for maximizing MTTSF or minimizing ˆ Ctotal with proper physical
interpretations given.
Figure 2 shows the effect of an intrusion detection interval (TIDS) on MTTSF as the
number of vote-participants (m) changes for the case in which the attacker function and the
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Fig. 2 Effect of m on MTTSF and optimal TIDS
detectionfunctionarebothlinear.WeobservethatthereexistsanoptimalTIDS thatmaximizes
MTTSF for each given m value. In general, as TIDS becomes larger, MTTSF increases until
its optimal point reaches, and then MTTSF decreases after the optimal point. The reason of
increasing MTTSF as TIDS increases initially is that as TIDS increases there are fewer nodes
being falsely identiﬁed by IDS since IDS is triggered less often, thus reducing the system
failure probability due to C2. Here we note that Pfp is one aspect of false alarms generated
by IDS, and therefore more nodes will be falsely identiﬁed as compromised nodes if IDS
is frequently triggered. After the optimal TIDS is reached, MTTSF decreases again as TIDS
increasesbecauseIDSisnottriggeredoftenenoughtodetectcompromisednodeswhichmay
perform attacks to cause system failures due to C1.
We also observe the sensitivity of optimal TIDS identiﬁed on MTTSF as m varies. When m
is large, the false alarm probability (Pfp + Pfn) is small because more nodes are participating
in the voting process, thereby reducing the possibility of collusion by compromised nodes.
Consequently, when m is large, we observe a high MTTSF due to the small false alarm prob-
ability. Conversely, when m is small, MTTSF is small due to a larger false alarm probability.
A smaller m also results in a longer optimal TIDS b e i n gu s e dt om a x i m i z eM T T S Ft oo f f s e t
the adverse effect of IDS with large false positives, e.g., optimal TIDS = 480,60,15, and 5s
for m = 3,5,7, and 9 respectively.
Figure 3 shows the overall communication cost ( ˆ Ctotal) versus intrusion detection interval
(TIDS) as the number of vote-participants (m) varies. An optimal TIDS exists in each curve
(minimum ˆ Ctotal) because of the tradeoff between decreasing normal group communication
costs ( ˆ CGC,i) and increasing IDS related communication costs ( ˆ Ceviction,i + ˆ CIDS,i) as TIDS
becomes shorter. Also we observe that when m is large, ˆ Ctotal is high. This is because a larger
m induces a lower Pfp under which more nodes will be able to perform normal group activ-
ities. Furthermore, when there are more vote participants, there is a higher cost associated
with dynamic majority voting. Contrary to MTTSF versus TIDS in Fig. 2, we do not observe
the sensitivity of an optimal TIDS identiﬁed, but there is a relatively higher communication
cost saved when the optimal TIDS identiﬁed is employed as m increases.
Next we analyze the effect of detection functions D(md) on MTTSF. Also as an example
of applicability, we investigate how one can select the best detection interval (TIDS) and
detection function D(md) to optimize MTTSFwhile satisfying the performance requirement
in terms of communication overhead, when given the attacker function A(mc) detected at
runtime.
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Fig. 3 Effect of m on ˆ Ctotal and Optimal TIDS
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Fig. 4 Effect of TIDS on MTTSF with respect to D(md) under linear time attacker function when m = 5
In Fig. 4,w es h o wM T T S Fv e r s u sTIDS for the three detection functions D(md) given that
the attacker function is linear. We see that each curve again has its own optimal TIDS.T h e
linear detection function Dlinear(md) shows the best performance at TIDS = 120s generating
the highest MTTSF overall, while the logarithmic detection function Dlog(md)i st h ew o r s t ,
particularly when TIDS is sufﬁciently small. This tradeoff is attributed to the speed of detec-
tion (log, linear, or exponential) versus the speed of attack (linear). If the former is greater
than the latter, many false positives may be generated; conversely, many compromised nodes
may remain in the system. The linear detection function matches up with the linear attacker
function the best among the three detection functions in terms of the tradeoff of the two ends.
With similar reasoning, we see that the strongest polynomial detection function Dpoly(md)
performsthebestforalargeTIDS (e.g.,TIDS > 240s)whiletheweakestlogarithmicdetection
function Dlog(md) performs the best for a small TIDS(TIDS<15s).
Figure 5 shows the overall communication cost ( ˆ Ctotal) versus TIDS for the three detection
functions D(md) given that the attacker function is linear. Each curve in Fig. 5 also has an
optimal TIDS that minimizes ˆ Ctotal. The general trend of the optimal TIDS identiﬁed is similar
tothatshowninFig.4althoughtheexactoptimalTIDS pointsidentiﬁedaredifferent.Thebest
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Fig. 5 Effect of TIDS on ˆ Ctotal with respect to D(md) under linear time attacker function when m = 5
performance of ˆ Ctotal is observed with linear detection at TIDS = 240s while the worst per-
formance of ˆ Ctotal is shown with logarithmic detection under the ranges of TIDS > 120 s and
withpolynomialdetectionundertherangesofTIDS ≤120s,resultinginthebestperformance
with linear detection overall. Also in terms of the optimal TIDS identiﬁed to minimize ˆ Ctotal,
we see that a shorter optimal TIDS is preferred with less aggressive logarithmic detection,
since a shorter TIDS contributes to nodes being evicted more often, consequently leading to
less group communication activities. On the other hand, as the detection function becomes
aggressive, i.e., polynomial detection, a longer optimal TIDS is favorable to minimize ˆ Ctotal
in order not to increase too much IDS related trafﬁc more than needed due to aggressive IDS.
In Figs. 6 and 7, we exemplify the selection of optimal design settings in terms of the
intrusiondetectioninterval(TIDS),thenumberofvote-participants(m),andtheIDSdetection
function D(md), once we identify the type of attacker function and performance constraints
set by the GCS at runtime. Fig. 6 shows the optimal MTTSF and the associated ˆ Ctotal val-
ues obtainable under three detection functions (log, linear and exponential), when given the
type of attacker function (in the X coordinate) and the performance constraints set by the
GCS system, i.e., MTTSFTH = 600,000s and ˆ Ctotal,TH = 500,000 hop bits/s representing
less stringent performance constraints. Table 3 lists the actual optimal values obtained as
well as the optimal settings (m,TIDS) under which the optimal values are obtained. Suppose
that due to the criticality of mission-oriented applications in MANETs, the design goal is to
maximize MTTSF while satisfying performance constraints. One can then do a table lookup
to select the linear IDS detection function to achieve the goal, given that a particular attack
function has been detected at runtime. Specifically, from Table 3 one would select to apply
the setting of m = 9a n dTIDS = 60s for logarithmic attacks, and m = 7a n dTIDS = 120s
for both linear and polynomial attacks. This table lookup can be performed upon detection
of the attacker function from observing historical data on compromised nodes that have been
detected by IDS.
Figure 6 is for the scenario in which performance constraints are relatively less stringent
where all three detection functions satisfy the imposed performance constraints. Figure 7
shows the optimal MTTSFand the associated ˆ Ctotal values obtainable for a scenario in which
performance constraints imposed are more stringent with MTTSFTH = 1000,000s and
ˆ Ctotal,TH = 480,000 hop bits/s. Table 4 lists the actual optimal values obtained as well as the
optimal settings (m,TIDS) under which the optimal values are obtained.
123744 J.-H. Cho, I.-R. Chen
1.00E+05
1.00E+06
1.00E+07
O
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
M
T
T
S
F
(
s
) logarithmic time detection
linear time detection
polynomial time detection
MTTSFTH= 600,000 (s)
3.50E+05
3.70E+05
3.90E+05
4.10E+05
4.30E+05
4.50E+05
4.70E+05
4.90E+05
5.10E+05
logarithmic attack linear attack polynomial attack
O
p
t
i
m
a
l
 
t
o
t
a
l
(
h
o
p
 
b
i
t
s
/
s
)
logarithmic time detection
linear time detection
polynomial time detection
total, TH = 500,000 (hop bits/s)
Fig. 6 Effect of detection functions on MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal under less stringent constraints
Table 3 Optimal settings for generating MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal corresponding to Fig. 6
MTTSFTH = 600,000 (s) Logarithmic detection Linear detection Polynomial detection
ˆ Ctotal,TH = 500,000 (hop bits/s)
(m,TIDS) MTTSF (m,TIDS) MTTSF (m,TIDS) MTTSF
ˆ Ctotal ˆ Ctotal ˆ Ctotal
Logarithmic attack (9,15) 5,637,970 (9, 60) 7,372,577 (9, 240) 6,565,735
392,698 469,471 398,400
Linear attack (7, 15) 653,848 (7, 120) 1,053,356 (7, 240) 948,253
472,934 476,857 494,642
Polynomial attack (5, 15) 653,671 (7, 120) 1,053,146 (7, 240) 948,048
473,018 476,932 494,582
InFigs.6and7,weseethatonlylineardetectionisabletomeettheperformanceconstraints
when the attacker function is linear or polynomial despite logarithm detection and exponen-
tial detection can generate a higher MTTSF. Consequently, the optimal setting identiﬁed is
m = 7a n dTIDS = 120s with the linear detection function being used to maximize MTTSF
while satisfying the ˆ Ctotal,TH requirement. When the attacker function is logarithmic, we see
that all three detection functions are able to satisfy the imposed performance constraints. In
this case, the linear detection function with m = 9a n dTIDS = 60s generates the highest
MTTSFvalueandisselectedforachievinghighersurvivabilityforthemission-orientedGCS
in MANETs.
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Fig. 7 Effect of detection functions on MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal under more stringent constraints
Table 4 Optimal settings for generating MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal corresponding to Fig. 7
MTTSFTH = 1,000,000 (s) Logarithmic detection Linear detection Polynomial detection
ˆ Ctotal,TH = 480,000 (hop bits/s)
(m,TIDS) MTTSF (m,TIDS) MTTSF (m,TIDS) MTTSF
ˆ Ctotal ˆ Ctotal ˆ Ctotal
Logarithmic attack (9, 15) 5,637,970 (9, 60) 7,372,577 (9, 240) 6,565,735
392,698 469,471 398,400
Linear attack (9, 5) 1,104,114 (7, 120) 1,053,356 (9, 5) 1,304,663
938,511 476,857 9,041,128
Polynomial attack (9, 5) 1,103,882 (7, 120) 1,053,146 (9, 5) 1,304,404
938,684 476,932 9,033,611
We also analyze the effect of node density on MTTSF and communication overhead. As
expected (the results are not shown to cut clutter), as the node density increases, the MTTSF
increases because the system will have more nodes and Condition C2 (leading to a security
failure) is less likely to be met. On the other hand, as the node density increases, the group
communicationoverheadincreasesbecausetherewillbemorenodesactivelyparticipatingin
group communication activities. Lastly, as the node density increases, the IDS performance
will improve because it is more likely to be able to ﬁnd m vote-participants to perform voting
to defend against collusion of compromised nodes.
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5.2 Simulation
Wehaveconductedextensivesimulationtovalidateanalyticalresultsobtainedusingthesame
set of parameter values listed in Table 2. The simulation program is implemented based on
a discrete-event simulation language called SMPL [24]. We populate the MANET area by
randomlyplacing150nodeswithintheoperationalareawithsize(500)2π km2 inoursimula-
tion.Inthiscase,theinitialnumberofmembernodes,i.e., Nλ/(λ+μ),is120approximately
and they are scattered in the operational area. All nodes can be connected through multiple
hops using a per-hop wireless radio range = 200 m. Multiple groups may be observed in the
operational area.
Each node in its lifecycle could generate six events, namely, GROUP JOIN, GROUP
LEAVE, BEACON, GROUP COMMUNICATION, GROUP MERGE, GROUP PARTI-
TION, INTRUSION DETECTION, and COMPROMISE. GROUP JOIN and GROUP
LEAVE events occur with rates of λ and μ respectively. We assume the inter-arrival time
is exponentially distributed. Upon the occurrence of a GROUP PARTITION or GROUP
MERGE event, the group view and the associated membership changes are updated. The
time a GROUP PARTITION event or a GROUP MERGE event occurs depends on the node
distribution and user mobility. We check occurrences of group merge/partition events by a
timer event. The GROUP COMMUNICATION and BEACON events are scheduled peri-
odically with a ﬁxed interval. The GROUP COMMUNICATION event occurs with rate λq.
If a compromised node triggers GROUP COMMUNICATION event, we consider the sys-
tem as having experienced a security failure due to violation of Condition C1. To expedite
data collection, we also turn off the host-IDS capability, that is, not detecting if the sender
is suspicious of compromised, so that whenever a compromised node involves in GROUP
COMMUNICATION event the system fails. The INTRUSION DETECTION event occurs
periodically at a rate given by the linear detection function in Eq. 4.W h e na nI N T R U S I O N
DETECTION event occurs, each good node is tested with the false positive probability to
see if it has been diagnosed by voting-based IDS as a bad node and each bad node is tested
with the false negative probability to see if has been diagnosed by IDS as a bad node. Lastly,
the COMPROMISE event occurs at a rate given by the linear attacker function in Eq. 3.
While we can consider any mobility model in the simulation, we adopt the random way-
point mobility model because of its popularity to model the movement of a node with the
mobility rate being σ, the pause time being 0, and the speed being:
S(σ) =
2r
expntl(1/σ)
(25)
where r is the radius of the area and expntl(1/σ) returns a random number exponentially
distributed with rate σ.
InmodelingtheCOMPROMISEevent,agoodnodeisselectedto-be-compromised(TBC)
whenwescheduleaCOMPROMISEevent.ATBCnode,likeacompromisedbutundetected
node, can freely join or leave a group. A TBC node then is compromised when the COM-
PROMISEeventoccurs,evenifitalreadyleavesthegroupitoriginallybelongsto.IftheTBC
node is falsely identiﬁed as a bad node by IDS before the COMPROMISE event occurs, the
COMPROMISEeventisdroppedandanewCOMPROMISEeventisscheduledrightafterthe
TBCnodeisevictedoutofthesystemduetofalsepositivesofIDS.UponaGROUPMERGE
orGROUPPARTITIONevent,allpreviouslyscheduledCOMPROMISEeventsinallgroups
involved in the group merge/partition events are canceled and a new COMPROMISE event
is scheduled in each involved group.
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A simulation run ends whenever a system failure occurs, either due to violation of Con-
dition C1 or Condition C2. We collect the system lifetime obtained when the system failure
occurs and execute another run from scratch. Figure 8 compares simulation results obtained
versus analytical results for MTTSF versus TIDS. The simulation results displayed are the
averagevaluesout of 100simulation runs.Wesee that thesimulation results exhibit a similar
trendcomparedwithanalyticalresults,identifyingtheoptimal TIDS at60asanalyticalresults
indicate. The mean percentage difference (MPD) between analytical results and simulation
results is 10% with the standard error (SE) being 5868 (approximately 5.7% out of 102294,
the optimal MTTSF at the optimal TIDS identiﬁed at 60). The MPD and SE are deﬁned by
[34]:
MPD=
 n
i=1
|xi−yi|
yi
n
, SE =
  n
i=1(xi − yi)2
n
(26)
where xi is a simulation result value, yi is an analytical result value, and n is the number of
result points.
As the MPD and SE values are sufﬁciently small, we conclude that simulation results
obtained match well with analytical results. The reason of having a slight difference between
analytical and simulation results is attributed to the fact that in the analytical model we
consider equal-size grouping, while in simulation groups do not necessarily have the same
size. Consequently, the rate at which system failures are triggered may also be different.
Nevertheless, overall we see a good correlation of simulation results versus analytical results
especially in the overall trend predicted and we conclude that the analytical results obtained
are valid.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have proposed and analyzed voting-based IDS against inside attackers for
secure GCSs in MANETs. The intrusion detection interval (TIDS) used by voting-based IDS
can be adjusted based on the behavior of inside attackers. Our analysis revealed the intrinsic
tradeoff between security (measured by the MTTSF metric) and performance (measured by
the overall communication cost ˆ Ctotal metric). When given a GCS characterized by a set
of parameter values, we showed that there exists an optimal detection interval (TIDS) that
123748 J.-H. Cho, I.-R. Chen
maximizes MTTSF as well as satisfying the constraint on the communication trafﬁc ( ˆ Ctotal).
The existence of the optimal detection interval (TIDS) for maximizing MTTSF is attributed
to the tradeoff between the positive effect of IDS (i.e., identifying compromised nodes and
evictingthemproperlytoprolongsystemlifetime)versustheadverseeffectofIDS(i.e.,false
negatives and false positives generated by IDS). The existence of the optimal detection inter-
val (TIDS) for minimizing ˆ Ctotal is attributed to the tradeoff between the IDS communication
trafﬁc versus the group communication trafﬁc.
We have investigated three ways to perform IDS detection with various vote-participants
and how the system could adjust the IDS detection level in response to the attacker strength
detectedatruntimeinordertomaximizeMTTSFandminimize ˆ Ctotal dynamically.Byselect-
ingthebestdetectionfunction(logarithmic,linear,orpolynomial)inresponsetotheattacker
strength, we can maximize MTTSF without experiencing much of the adverse effect of IDS.
The results obtained in terms of MTTSF and ˆ Ctotal versus TIDS allow the system designer to
select the best intrusion detection interval (TIDS) to maximize MTTSF, or minimize ˆ Ctotal,
depending on the security versus performance requirements, or to maximize MTTSF while
satisfying the ˆ Ctotal performance requirements. To apply the results, one can cover a wide
range of values of model parameters and build a table at static time listing the selection of
the intrusion detection interval (TIDS) that can both maximize MTTSF and/or minimize the
overall communication cost ( ˆ Ctotal). Then, at runtime, the system can perform a table lookup
operationtoselectthebestintrusiondetectionfunction,thebestIDSdetectioninterval(TIDS)
andthebestnumberofvote-participantsforvoting-basedIDSbasedonstatisticalinformation
collected dynamically.
In the future, we plan to enhance the adaptability of voting-based IDS to changing and
evolvingnetworkenvironments.Weareinvestigatingtheuseofautonomiclearningtodeduce
the attacker strength function based on the attacker proﬁles so as to apply the best detection
function at the optimal setting to maximize MTTSF and/or minimize ˆ Ctotal for mobile GCSs.
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